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SOME LIGHT may be shed on one of the perennial questions of jurisprudence
by considering it in the light of an analogy furnished by metaphysics. The
question is, What are the general constituent elements of law? The analogy
is the answer given to the even broader question, What are the constituent
elements of being?
To those who have no taste for metaphysics, or believe it to be a disci-
pline consisting in the otiose shuffling of words, this appeal to its tools must
appear a compounding of confusion. Yet now, as always, there is everywhere,
except possibly in England, a substantial body of philosophers who take serious-
ly, as Western philosophers from Plato to Heidegger have taken seriously, the
great attempt to reason about the structure of reality. To them my present
attempt to apply the Thomistic analysis of being to law may seem warranted.
I. THE Two COMPONENTS OF LAW
ONE FACT is determinable in the history of legal thought. There has been
constant oscillation between what are commonly called "natural law" and
"legal positivism."
To be sure, neither of these positions has always been pushed to its
extreme consequences. The history of Anglo-American legal thinking, for
obvious reasons, testifies to a more peaceful course than the continental
tradition. The movement back and forth between legal positivism and
natural law in the most recent development of law in Germany has, in
contrast, been especially measurable. Naturally, this is no accident. Extreme
* This article has been translated from the German by the Staff of the FORUM. With the
approval of the author, the translation has compressed parts of the original and has, in the
interests of clarity to readers of English, occasionally sacrificed a literal translation to an
effort to express the author's basic ideas. The American lawyer may all too often share the
view that H. L. A. Hart attributes to the English lawyer: "If he believes at all that there
are points where law and metaphysics meet, these are felt to be on the periphery of his
concerns, if not in an outer darkness." Hart, Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence in
Britain, 1945-1952, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 355, 357 (1953). For a
good example of the rather quizzical way in which an American professor of law is apt to
view metaphysics, see Hessel E. Yntema, jurisprudence and Metaphysics- A Triangular
Correspondence, 59 YALE LAW JOURNAL 273 (1950). This kind of doubt, faintheartedness,
or outright rejection of metaphysics is, of course, an attitude vigorously deplored by the
author of this article.
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positivism during the time of the Nazi dictatorship had the slogans, "A
command is a command" and "Law is law," and brought about, in areas,
a complete perversion of law. After the Second World War its approach
was replaced by the much discussed renaissance of natural law thinking.
This movement, however, has now often gone beyond its goal too far in the
other direction. Some courts, appealing to an alleged natural law, have
pushed aside valid laws which blocked their way to a desired decision;
they have, for example, imposed punishments which were not at all envisaged
by the law. There is, therefore, an explicit and perceptible disenchantment,
even a reaction to neopositivism. These events have demonstrated before
our eyes in Germany something at all times demonstrated by history, although
never so plainly, and of general validity: both a one-sided natural law
approach and a one-sided positivistic approach do not correspond to the
ontological structure of law; each in its absoluteness is jurisprudentially
untenable and cannot alone endure. It is quite remarkable that as some
have spoken of "the eternal return of natural law," so have others spoken
of "the eternal return of legal positivism."' This persistent fluctuation
between natural law and positivism makes plain better than any theoretical
arguments that each interpretation emphasizes one aspect and only one
aspect, that neither may be treated as sufficient without injury to reality.
Reflection confirms the testimony of the history of thought. Neither legal
positivism nor natural law seems tolerable. The view that we "must recog-
nize as binding even the basest statute, so long as it has been enacted with
formal correctness ' 2 can no longer be considered after the experience of
the Fascist and Communist dictatorships. The history of the recent past
has given us a kind of "metaphysical experience" with almost the exactness of
an experiment in the natural sciences. It has shown that for the validity of law
there must be more than legality.
Yet we are on an equally wrong track if we oppose to legal positivism
a "suprapositive natural law." One is then exposed to the warranted objection
that there cannot be two equally valid orders of law and that one is necessarily
superfluous. 3 A suprapositive law possesses no reality as law.
It is evident that both views, that of legal positivism and that of idealistic
natural law, say something true about law, but that insofar as they do not
correspond to its ontological structure, each takes one side of the law for
1. See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE ETERNAL RETURN OF NATURAL LAW (1947) and D.
Lang-Hinrichsen, Zur Ewigen Wiederkehr des Rechtspositivismus, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR
E. MEZGER lff. (1954).
2. K. BERGOBHM, 1 JURISPRUDENZ UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 144 (1892).
3. See, for example, HANS KELSEN, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER NATUR-
RECHTSLEHRE UND DES RECHTSPOSITIVISMUS 27 ff. (1928).
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the whole. Gustav Radbruch has said, "It is no less part of the concept
of just law to be legal than it is the task of positive law to be just. ' ' 4 The
doubleness of the essence of law and the existence of law, of natural law-
fulness (Naturrechtlichkeit) and legality (Positivitlit), creates the ontological
structure of law. The one-sided monistic conception of law must, then, give
way to a dualistic one, or, more exactly, to a polar conception of law. The
relation of natural lawfulness and legality of law must be understood neither
as a relation of identity, with one being necessarily contained in the other,
nor in the opposite way as if they were two alternatives, but the relation
must be understood as a relation of polarity, as a relation of contraries
completing and supporting each other. 5
The polarity of natural lawfulness and legality expresses the relation of
the validity of law to its effectiveness. 6 We have here the key to an under-
standing of both main themes of legal philosophy: justice and certainty; law
and power. Basically, they center on one and the same question, the question
of the ontological structure of law. The monistic theories of law fasten on
only one aspect of legal reality: positivism, on the existential; idealistic natural
law, on the essential. The former sees only the certainty, the effectiveness,
the factual power of the norm; the latter sees law only from the angle of
justice, substantive content and material validity. Positivism regards the
validity of the norm to be the result of its effectiveness; idealistic natural
law regards validity as the criterion of the effectiveness. The problems con-
4. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 169 (1956).
5. On the philosophical concept of polarity which explains the association of contraries
and relative opposites, see HANS MEYER, 2 SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE 34 (1958).
These polarities can be compared as soul and body or as man and wife. Compare F. A.
von der Heydte, Von Wesen des Naturrechts, 40 ARCHIV FR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSO-
PHIE 220 (1952). Cf. the remarks of Iredell Jenkins, The Matchmaker or Toward a Synthesis
of Legal Idealism and Positivism, 12 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 1, 30 (1959):
Yet, positivism and idealism perpetually renew this quarrel, when it appears on
the point of extinction in concrete cooperation, because each persists in challenging the
other with a ridiculous and abstract either/or. Positivism says, in effect: "Either
establish that you can reach absolute and categorical knowledge of values, or leave
them alone until you can." Idealism says, in effect: "Either establish that you can
operate the legal system entirely without recourse to values, or leave it alone until
you can." It needs no argument to make manifest the utter impossibility of these
undertakings. But that has not prevented the idealists and positivists from attempting
them. And it is precisely this dedication to lost causes that is responsible for the
mood of despair and antagonism that pervades so much modern legal philosophy.
Goaded by the positivist challenge, idealism has concerned itself much too exclusively
with proclaiming the existence of absolute values and the dependence of law upon
exact knowledge of them. Similarly, positivism has concerned itself too exclusively
with asserting the autonomy of the legal order and with seeking to make it internally
self-sufficient. To the extent that effort is diverted to these tasks of Sisyphus, legal
theory becomes sterile and esoteric, and legal practice reflects these ills and suffers
correspondingly.
6. On the relations between ontology and logic, see W. Goldschmidt, 3 OSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 186, 201 (New series, 1950).
NATURAL LAW FORUM
cerning "law and power, .... justice and certainty," are finally insoluble for
both views; each has suppressed one member of the relation in favor of
the other. The supple relation of polarity is not generally seen, or if it is
seen, it is pushed off as an antinomy belonging to the apparently unanswerable
questions of law. 7 We recognize, then, that the reality of law becomes clear
in the association of the essential element with the existential element, of
natural lawfulness with positivity, so that justice and certainty, validity and
effectiveness, lawfulness and power, legitimacy and legality, are neither
identifiable nor antagonistic, but are related as polar forces and so stand
in a fruitful exchange with one another. A one-sided emphasis on justice
fails to correspond to the ontological structure just as much as the assertion
that power is what distinguishes the legal character of a norm. Justice as a
suprapositive principle of law effectively exists only in positive law, and
positive law is valid only through its participation in justice. The neglect
of positivity endangers the certainty of law; the neglect of justice endangers
the certainty of law. Each conditions the other and needs the other.
Through this ontological foundation a new and deeper sense may be
given to the concept of positivity. This sense is distinct from that of the
prevailing opinion which limits itself to a positivistic assertion that legality
is the property of a norm "which is set out by a subject." s Legality is
now identified with the presence, the corporeity, the being of law. The
positivity of law means such a measure of actualization and concretization
of its essence that something is justiciable, that we can grasp it, handle it, use it.
There are legal norms which are positive, but not legislated - for example,
customary law which owes its positivity not to an act setting the norm but
to common and continuous usage. On the other hand, there are legal norms
which are so abstract and indefinite in their limits that they cannot be con-
sidered positive in an ontological sense - above all, the so-called public policy
arguments as, for example, the command to consider "good morals."
Such invocations of public policy testify forcefully that the accepted con-
cept of legality is jurisprudentially unusable. For an essential function of
legality, it is agreed, consists in its guarantee of certainty of law. But no one
would seriously assert that "public policy," although it is a legal norm, is a
certain norm. The certainty of law is, rather, guaranteed through public
policy being made concrete in judicial decisions and in the study of law.
The reality of law has, thus, a bipolar structure. The bipolarity means
7. Compare RADBRUCH, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 174 ff.; esp. 181 ff., where he treats the
antinomy involved in the problem of validity as insoluble. But see also RADBRUCH, VOR-
SCHULE DER REcHTSPHILOSOPHIE 35 ff. (1959).
8. For example, Ren6 Marcic, Die bedingte Natur des positiven Rechts, 15 JURISTENZEI-
TUNG 198f., 200 (1960).
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that its essence and existence are not identical. This determination is set
out both against legal positivism and against idealistic or rationalistic natural
law thought.
II. THE Two COMPONENTS OF BEING
THE STRUCTURE of law I have just outlined amounts to a transposition to
the structure of legal being of the familiar metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.
In his terms, essence is that through which a definition may be given of a
thing; it is the sign which a definite thing possesses in a potential state.
Existence is the realization or actualization of this possibility. 9
By these two, essence and existence, the structure of real things is given.
Ideal concepts possess no proper, independent existence, but only an existence
which is merely conceivable or imaginable, as, for example, the literary form
of Faust.10 Real things, on the other hand, have an independent existence
and do not exist merely in being conceived. This independent existence comes
from essence taking form in some corporeal shape which receives it (Thomas
Aquinas puts it, "Quidditas est recepta in materia"11 ). The essence first be-
comes present in a body. There are no pure essences in our world; they
would lose themselves in shapelessness. Even spiritual substances can have
effect only if they assume real shape; they need something to make them
things such as tangible sacraments and institutions.
In our world the distinction of essence and existence is the foundation
for the change, development, and decay which we observe in all things. If
existence were a component of the essence of beings, they would always exist.
But this is the case only with absolute being, with God, "whose essence is his
existence."' 12 God is ens a se, the ens realissimum, the actus purus, and He
therefore exists necessarily and eternally. 13 Earthly things have no absolute
being; they are contingent and terminable. Their essences do not necessarily
possess existence. They were not always in existence, and what does not exist
today may exist tomorrow. Their essences can be conceived of as pure poten-
9. All substances, says Thomas Aquinas, are composed "by that which they are" and
"what they are," quo est and quod est. DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA ch. 5. See A. BRUNNER, DER
STUFEN AU DER WELT 463 ff. (1950); Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Realontologie, in 6 JAHR-
BUCH FUiR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHANOMENOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG 159 ff. (1923); NICOLAI
HARTMANN, GRUNDLEGUNG DER ONTOLOGIE 88 if., 110 ff., 128 ff. (3rd ed. 1948); JOHAN-
NES HESSEN, 3 LEBREUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE 37 ff., 56 ff. (1950); H. KRINOS, FRAGEN UND
AUFOABEN DER ONTOLOGIE 17 ff., 45 ff., 72 ff., 120 ff. (1954); H. MEYER, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 100 ff.; C. NINK, ONTOLOGIE 11 ff. (1952); EDITH STEIN, ENDLICHES UND
EWIGES SEIN 31, 117 ff. (1950). For a view based on the existentialist ontology of Heideg-
ger see also MAX MULLER, EXISTENZPHILOSOPHIE IM GEISTIGEN LEBEN DER GEGENWART
14 ff., 83 ff. (2nd ed. 1958).
10. Compare Conrad-Martius, op. cit supra note 9, at 161 ff.
11. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA ch. 6.
12. Idem.
13. Conrad-Martius, op. cit. supra note 9, at 167, 181; KRINGS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 75.
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tiality. The nonexistence of a thing is not equivalent to the impossibility of
its being.
The distinction of existence and essence which my traditional analysis
supposes is usually described in technical jargon as a distinction made by
reason with a basis in reality. In short, the distinction is asserted to be
neither purely logical, nor purely perceptible in real being. It is reached by
the consideration that if essence and existence can be separated in thought
- and we can surely conceive of essences apart from their existence - then
they must be distinct in reality.
14
The basic metaphysical distinction between essence and existence parallels,
it will be remarked, the distinction already made between legality and justice
in law. That this should be the case follows from my premises according
to which law belongs to what the phenomenologists call "a regional ontology."
Being is analogous. What it is analyzable into in general, may be found in
any particular area of being.
Werner Maihofer has conceived the question of an ontology of law in
a different fashion. Although he recognizes that he is dealing with a regional
ontology, he believes that he can take the fundamental ontological question
of Heidegger, "Why is there being and not nothing?"' 15 and use it as a basis
for the corresponding question "Why is there law, rather than no law?"
1 6
But he thus misses the proper theme of the ontology of law. The question
why there is generally any kind of entity is entirely distinct from the other
question why there is precisely this or that determined entity. The first
question has as its object, being in general, as being is the ground of each
entity. 1 7 The second question does not lead to the "being" of determined
entities, for their immediate causes can be found in other entities. This is in
fact the case with law. There is, to be sure, law only because there are
14. This kind of distinction is traditionally described as a distinctio rationis cum funda-
mento in re. See J. HESSEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 41. See also H. MEYER, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 102 ff.; A. BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161 ff.; P. L. ZAMPETTI, 2 PROB-
LEMA DELLA GIUSTIZIA NEL PROTESTANTESIMO TEDESCO CONTEMPORANEO 108 ff. (1962);
ALLERS, ERLXUTERUNGEN ZU THOMAS VON AqUIN, DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA 80, 104, 107, 133
(3rd ed., 1956).
15. HEIDEGGER, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE METAPHYSIK 1, 21, 153 (1953); WAS 1ST METAPHY-
SIK? 21, 23, 42 (7th ed., 1955). According to Heidegger there is an ontological difference
only where there is a distinction between being as such (esse) and an entity (ens). In classi-
cal metaphysics, where concentration is directed to the difference between essence and exist-
ence, the focus is on "the entity as such and the determination proper to it." (ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS 1003a). Heidegger accuses this kind of philosophy with "forgetfulness of
being" and calls it "essence philosophy." It is true that the fundamental question of ontology
concerns being and not entity. However, reality is such that we are not able to know being
as it stands independent of all entities. We may question it, but we cannot make it the object
of knowledge, for it is the last thing to be questioned and so cannot be further defined.
16. W. MAIHOFER, RECHT UND SEIN: PROLEGOMENA ZU EINER RECHTSONTOLOGIE 38, 39
(1954).
17. Cf. HEIDEGGER, VOM WESEN DES GRUNDES 18 (3rd ed., 1949).
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entities in general, but first and properly there is law because there are men
and because man as a social being needs law. This is, indeed, the express
conclusion of Maihofer's investigation: "the ground and object of all law
is . . . the property of social being needing to complete its being in existence
with others."' 8 Because of the inner analogy (the analogy of being) between
man and law something more may be said on the social nature of law; to
this extent there is an ontology of law.
If, with Heidegger, one recognizes an ontological difference only between
being and entity, nothing but a fundamental ontology is possible. 19 Regional
ontologies are possible only as philosophies of essence, as the phenomenological
school of Edmund Husserl has rightly seen.20 This means regional ontologies
are possible only on the foundation of the ontological distinction between
essence and existence. The question of a regional ontology can never be
whether or why an entity is, but only what it is.2 1 To this extent Maihofer
must be rejected. However, his approach to law through the use of the analogy
of being has justification. The character of law as being can in fact be
extensively understood only by comparison with the mode of being of man.
It is his way of putting the question that is erroneous. Why is there law at
all? To ask this question seems to ask of law the properties of man. It seems to
set up an anthropology of law. But, as Maihofer himself says, the real task of
an ontology of law is an examination of the "structure of being of the law." 22
What is fundamental, then, for the ontology of law is the difference
between essence and existence. The implications of this difference I shall
now develop.
III. CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUENTS OF BEING
THE ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTION between the essence and the existence of
law, between legality (Positivitiit) and justice (Naturrechtlichkeit), opens
a way to understand the meaning of the "historical nature of law," one of
18. MAIHOFER, op. cit supra note 16, at 125. Cf. also pp. 30 ff., 73 ff., 83 ff. See also his
VOM SINN MENSCHLICHER ORDNUNO 41 ff., 70 ff. (1956). In these places Maihofer asserts
against the one-sidedness of existentialism that the social being is as original as the individual
self-being. This is the particular merit of his work. In German, Maihofer reads as follows:
"Grund und Ziel allen Rechts ist ... die Eigentlichkeit des Alsseins, in der sich das Selbstsein
in seinem Dasein mit Andern zu vollbringen hat."
19. Heidegger says expressly, "The first philosophical step in the undertaking of the prob-
lem of being starts with . . . an entity as an entity and not with a question of an entity's
origin in other entities." SEIN UND ZEIT 6 (7th ed., 1953).
20. The basic work is EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEEN ZU EINER REINEN PHXNOMENOLOGIE UND
PHXNOMaNOLOGISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, esp. bk. 1, pp. 309 ff. (2nd ed., 1922).
21. Cf. R. REININoER, 2 METAPHYSIK DER WIRKLICHRET 4 (2nd ed., 1948).
22. MAIHOFER, RECHT UND SEIN 66 (1954), referring to MAX MULLER, SEIN UND GEIST:
SYSTEMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ijBER GRUNDPROBLEME UND AUFBAU MITTELALTER-
LICHER ONTOLOaIE 36 (1940).
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the most pressing problems of modem jurisprudence. That the law, including
natural law, is conditioned by time and by situation, that it is not static,
but dynamic, that it possesses a structure determined by time in history -
that is both our way to new roads and a rediscovery of the classic paths.23
Yet particular investigations of these questions, focusing on the ontological
problems, are rather sparse. 24 At the same time, general philosophy in the
last decade has intensively focused on the problem of history.2 5 In this
article I cannot comment on these developments at length. But it is remark-
able that the more recent philosophical investigations of the phenomena of
time and of history have been scarcely used by jurisprudence.
In speaking of the historicity of law, I do not mean the empirical history
of concepts and their historical realization. Our problem lies not in the
history of law, but in the ontology of law. It is the "problem of the unique
and nonoptional historical task."' 26 This problem is not concerned with how law
really exists in history. What is important is how it has a history, how it is
determined in its nature by the mode of history. It is a matter of the onto-
logical history of law itself.
In Natural Law and History I tried to show that this problem could not
be resolved either through a historicist's conception of law or through an
absolutist conception.2 7 Historicism resolves the entire character of law into
the empirical facts of history and recognizes nothing constant, nothing time-
less in the law. It entangles itself in the contradictions of an unlimited rela-
23. See my suggestions in DAS SCHULDPRINZiP 86 ff. (1961).
24. In chronological sequence there have been the following: E. Opocher, Diritto e tempo, 9
ACTES Du XIEME CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE PHILOSOPHIE 85 if. (1953); GERHART Hus-
SERL, REcHT UND ZEIT 7 if. (1955); G. Del Vecchio, Mutabilita ed eternith del diritto, Jus
RIVISTA DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 1 ff. (1954); ARTHUR KAUFMANN, NATURRECHT UND
GESCHICHTLICHKEIT (1957); Kaufmann, Diritto naturale e storicith, Jus RiVISTA DI SCI-
ENZE GIURmICHE 178 ff. (1959); G. Del Vecchio, Wandelbarkeit und Unverganglichkeit
des Rechts, 14 UNIVERSITAS 1175 ff. (1959); J. J. M. VAN DER VEN, GRUNDRECHTE UND
GESCHICHTLICHKEIT (1960). See also L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953);
G. DULCKEIT, PHILOSOPHIE DER RECHTSGESCHICHTE (1950); K. ENOISCH, VOM WELTBILD
DES JURISTEN 67 ff. (1950); A. VILLANI, HEIDEGGER E IL "PROBLEMA" DEL DIRITTO (1958).
One essay linking ontology and law in an American legal journal is Ilnar Tammelo, On the
Space and Limits of Legal Experience, 11 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 171 (1958) -
chiefly on the ontology of Louis Lavelle.
25. HEIDEGGER, SEIN UND ZEST 372 ff.; JASPERS, PHILOSOPHIE (3rd ed., 1956), Vol. II,
pp. 118 ff.; Vol. III, pp. 18 ff., 24 ff.; N. HARTMANN, DAS PROBLEM DES GEISTIGEN SEINS
(2nd ed., 1949), Part 3, Sec. 2, pp. 456. A. BRUNNER, GESCHICHTLIcHKEIT (1961); HED-
WIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DIE ZEIT (1954). H. BARTH, DAS SEIN IN DER ZEIT (1933); 0. F.
BOLLNOW, EXISTENZPHILOSOPHIE 104 ff., 112 ff. (4th ed., 1955); G. JACOBY, ALLGEMEINE
ONTOLOGIE DER WIRKLICHKEIT, 523 ff. (1955); K. L6WITH, HEIDEGER-DENKER IN
DURFTIGER ZEIT 43 ff. (1953); H. MEYER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 77 ff.; M. MULLER, Ex-
ISTENZPHILOSOPHIE IM GEISTIGEN LEBEN DER GEGENWART 28 ff., 32 ff. (2nd ed., 1958);
W. WIELAND, F. SCHELLINGS LEHRE VON DER ZEIT (1956).
26. M. MULLER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 34. Cf. also VAN DER VEN, Op. cit. supra note
24, at 12.
27. ARTHUR KAUFMANN, NATURRECHT UND GESCHICHTLICHKEIT 14 ff., 21 ff. (1957);
Diritto naturale e storicita, loc. cit. supra note 24, at 184 ff., 189 ff.
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tivism. Precisely because of its panhistorical approach, it loses a grasp on
history and becomes itself a form of absolutism. 28 On the other hand,
absolutism treats a legal order as valid for all time and breaks down in the
face of the facts of the history of law. It then retreats to a few, small first
principles, idly leaving the content of law to relativism. It is a paradoxical
but fundamental principle that every point of view, carried to its extreme,
turns into its opposite. An exaggerated absolutism culminates finally in its
polar opposite, relativism, and thereby contradicts itself.
The historical character of the law must be given a place between rela-
tivism and absolutism. It cannot mean either a timeless natural law, which
is ever and never valid, nor a timeless legal positivism, in which laws are
arbitrary and unconnected events in the stream of time. It is necessary to
replace these contraries and to make "a synthesis between absoluteness and
relativeness, existing law and law in process, constant elements and develop-
ing elements, eternity and history." 29 This synthesis can be founded only
on the basic structure of law, in the polarity between natural law and positive
law, in the ontological difference between essence and existence.
Thus law, to whose essence existence does not necessarily belong, is con-
tingent and terminable. If there were an absolute law, it would have to have
existed in complete justice from the beginning and forever. We know by
experience that this is not the case. The content of justice in a law may be
realized in greater or lesser degrees, and it is even possible that it may not
be realized. Indeed, it is possible, as we have experienced, that as a posi-
tive norm, a statute will be set out which is unjust, which is nonlaw.
Because of the ontological differences between the essence and existence of
law, there may be at any time a perverting of law, and the perverted content
may take positive form. This perversion of law is a constant danger and is
always present, not only in a tyranny. There can be no doubt then that
law - just law, natural law - does not possess an absolute existence in our
world.
With all earthly things, including law, there are a beginning and a past,
which occur objectively in time. But this is not what is meant by ontological
historicity in the significant sense of the structure of being. This latter kind of
historicity may be comprehended only by men, for it is only within the scope
of men.
28. ZAMPETTI, op. cit. supra note 14, at 115 rightly calls historicism "absolutization of the
relative."
29. M. MOLLER, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 34. H. Ryffel also attempts to find a "way be-
tween relativism and absolutism." Der Wertpluralismus unserer Zeit als philosophisches
Problem, 42 ARCHLY FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 305 ff., 507 ff. (1956). See also
A. ARNDT, RECHTSDENKEN IN UNSERER ZEIT: POSITIVISMUS UND NATURRECHT 21 (1955).
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There are, of course, many beings such as plants and animals, whose
essence and existence are distinct and whose beings are therefore contingent.
But animal creatures are not themselves aware of this condition, and their
existence is not determined by this knowledge. They always exist in the
completeness of their essence without their being able or obliged to alter it.
They do not need to develop their essence, and, therefore, they cannot fail
to complete it. An animal acts through necessity in which he finds himself
bound and is thereby safe. He knows no risk, no decision, no error. It is
quite different with men. Unlike the animals, man is not locked up in his
own essence, limited to a shuttered environment of peepholes. Due to his
spiritual consciousness he may grasp the whole of reality, including himself.
As Scheler and Gehlen have formulated it, man is "environment-free" and
"open to the world." He is not only in the world, but he has the world. 30
He possesses the faculty of "putting everything at a distance from himself
and himself at a distance from everything; even putting himself apart from
himself, of objectivising everything including himself." 3 1  In thinking he
may separate the essence of things from their existence; he may spiritually
oppose all beings to each other and so grasp his own being. In the capability
to transcend himself, to reach being, "outside and beyond" any particular
being, and beyond himself as a particular being, lie the roots of the spirituality
and freedom of man.
3 2
As a result of this openness to the world and its accompanying freedom,
the difference between essence and existence is realized by man in a way
quite different from its realization in subhuman things. Man may always
reflect upon his own potentiality. He can always look upon himself as a
free person giving orders to himself. He is his own master. This does not
mean, as Sartre thinks, that existence precedes essence, so that man in com-
plete freedom can arbitrarily determine the object of his life. Rather, as
metaphysics, especially scholastic metaphysics teaches, the conclusion to be
drawn is precisely the opposite: essence is given as the object to be achieved
by existence. 33 Man is not absolutely free. He cannot say, "Whatever I do,
30. M. SCHELER, DIE STELLUNG DES MENSCHEN IM KosMos 37 ff. (1949); A. GEHLEN,
DER MENSCH: SEINE NATUR UND SEINE STELLUNG IN DER WELT 33 ff., 42 if., 208 ff., 366
ff. (6th ed., 1958).
31. M. Miller, Freiheit, in STAATSLEXIKON -REcHT WIRTSCHAFT GESELLSCHAFT 530
(6th ed., 1959).
32. Ibid., where Miller speaks of a "transcendental liberty."
33. Cf. M. MULLER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 60. He demonstrates that in Thomas Aquinas
there is not only a primacy of essence over existence, but yet the esse stands ahead of the
essentia, because the latter is limitation, compulsion and reception for the esse. At the same
time, essence in its acceptance is the foundation and bearer of existence. Thus there is a
pure correlation.
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I always fulfill my essence." 3 4 The development of man's essence does not
occur by the power of a natural necessity; nor is it in his arbitrary determina-
tion. But it is the consequence of a spiritual act, of a freedom directed to
meaning and value.
This freedom is man's permanent and never completed task, and, because
he is free, he is able to fail in his task. The ability and the task to determine
himself for himself give birth in him to the possibility of erring, of misunder-
standing his own essence. Man may take risks; so has he responsibility to
make himself and his work what they may be made. Freedom of decision
is not only privilege, but burden.
From this viewpoint we may understand the time-imprinted character
and historicity of man as a form of the structure of his being. Unlike unspirit-
ual natures, man is not simply present; he does not develop himself like plants
and animals, who stand objectively in time. Man has to become in order
to be. He has the task to develop himself in time and out of time, to become
his possibilities. Man has a consciousness of time and history, and so a way
of transcending his existential present by means of the past and the future.
He can plan, wait, fear, hope, and remember. History is the dimension in
which he must come to his essence. As Welzel says, "History is the real
development and the shaping of a meaningful order of life in which man
seeks to bring his existence into a meaningful and enduring order."3 5  In
taking up the past, with its inheritance and its guilt, and in planning ahead
to the future, man has to achieve what is just for the present, justice here
and now.30 Placed as a being who sees into time and history, he must work
out his tasks by means of an effective collaboration with time and history.
He must today sacrifice yesterdays for the sake of the future. He must always
begin afresh. His work is never finished. He is always en route. He is
always homo viator. Man is a vital spiritual being, says Scheler; he is "not
a being at rest, not a given, but a potential in process; he is eternally to be
undertaken; a goal ever to become."3 7 For a human being the difference
34. Sartre, speaking explicitly of man, has said "Existence precedes essence." L'EXISTEN-
TIALISME EST UN HUMANISME 17, 21 (1959). "Man is merely as he conceives himself to be."
"He is as he wills himself to be, as he conceives himself to be according to his existence."
"Man is not other than what he makes himself. This is the first principle of existentialism."
There is "no other lawgiver than himself." Man has no freedom, but "man is freedom." Id.
at 22, 93, 36.
35. H. Welzel, Personlichkeit und Schuld, 60 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTS-
WISSENSCHAFT 428 ff., 454 (1941).
36. On the connection between justice now and existential concept of time see HEMEGGER,
SEIN UND ZEsT, sec. 2, chs. 2 and 3. Fifteen hundred years before him, Augustine had
emphasized the factor of time in human existence. See CONFESSIONS, Book XI.
37. SCHELER, Op. cit. supra note 30, at 27. See also GFHLEN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 36:
"Man is determined by having to 'work himself out' and finding as 'his own work' his exist-
ence as a task." In the same sense, that man has the task of developing himself, see also
Welzel, op. cit. supra note 35, at 433, 446, 450, 454.
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between existence and essence is not simply an existing fact, but a living
tension out of which he is called to draw the conception of himself and to
bring himself into just correspondence with himself and his environment.
In history so understood, in the constant grasping for being and the devel-
opment of essence, lies the route of human personality. A person is a spiritual
individuality which is ordered from within to a completion of itself. At the
same time a person is a social individuality. Man, who is directed by nature
to the greatest possible development of his essence, cannot reach this goal
as an isolated being. He must associate himself with others to reach the full-
ness of his being. It is the spiritual nature of man himself which refers him
to other men. His social character is not something added to the person
from without; it is founded in his historical personality, in his spiritual capa-
bility of completing himself and his spiritual need of completing himself. This
is the meaning of solidarity, in contrast to either individualism or collectivism.
Man's mode of being is reflected in the mode of being of things which
depend on man, which exist only because man exists: language, art, science,
law. They share in the nature of man's essence. Thus law is historical in its
meaning as man is. It is not a pure fact like an unspiritual thing having no
internal reference to history. Law is in its very being determined by history.
It has the "time-structure of historicity."3 s This is not to be understood
merely as an assertion of the historical character of legal knowledge. The
historicity of law means rather that its essence is bound to realize itself here
and now. It means the concrete and particular character of the timeless
content of justice in time and history. The essence and the existence of
law are to be brought again and again into correspondence, 3 9 so that law
may at the same time reach its true character and develop itself, that there
may be here and now developed law which is just for this time.
The difference between being and existence, between natural law and
positive law, is a living polarity in the process of being actuated, a continuing
and uncompleted being in the way of development. Natural law is based
on this process. It is derived not from a static, but from a completely dynamic
nature. It must constantly develop to something new in order to become
itself. There is never a law which is finished, but always a law which is
becoming.
40
38. GERHART HUSSERL, op. cit. supra note 24, at 20, 22.
39. On this view of "correspondence" as the essence of order, compare for another view
MAIHOFER, VOM SINN MENSCHLICHER ORDNUNG 64 ff. (1956).
40. Similarly E. FECHNER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 185, 261 (2nd ed., 1956). See also J.
MESSNER, DAS NATURRECHT 318 ff. (3rd ed., 1958), and Von der Heydte, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 224. Compare also VAN DER VEN, Op. cit. supra note 24, at 28: "Fundamental
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Such a human historical character as law possesses would be without
meaning if there were not at the same time a transcendental goal beyond all
history. This insight has been unerringly expressed by the first existentialist
philosopher of the Christian West, St. Augustine. There would be no time
if it were not given by Him "Who in the sublimity of an ever present eternity
is above all past and all future."' 4 1 For us our cor inquietum testifies to this,
as thirst proves the existence of water. As Kierkegaard has expressed it, the
despair of man in the presence of the end of his being, of death, is a direct
proof of the "eternal in man." "If there was nothing eternal in man, he
could not despair."
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In modern existential philosophy this absolute background of time and his-
tory is no longer grasped clearly; indeed, it is expressly rejected. 4 3 Nor can it be
denied that our incomplete human power of knowledge is not in a position
to get hold on the absolute with certitude and completeness. The absolute
is never given to us in unbroken purity. If we think we grasp it, it is no
longer entirely the absolute. Del Vecchio says, "To know the absolute is to
assert a contradiction in terms, for the absolute, as soon as it is known, be-
comes relative." 4 4 Yet this epistemological relativity is no proof that the absolute
does not exist. 45 On the contrary, without the absolute, a relativity of knowl-
edge would not be possible, and we could never be conscious of relativity.
As movement exists only in relation towards the unmoved, so relativity exists
only in relation to what is not relative; what is time and history exists only
on the horizon of the supratemporal and superhistorical. Of course we can-
not grasp and hold the absolute. Yet to make absolute the historical involves
a pure contradiction; the time-character of all historical being has meaning
only against a background of what is timeless and has a content above time.4 6
The historical nature of law similarly cannot be made absolute without thereby
denying the being and function of law. The situation ethics of existentialism
laws cannot be thought about or created, any more than positive law except by a constant
confrontation with the concrete realities of man and society. Indeed, being itself always
emerges in a new way in each historical situation." Cf. Lon Fuller, "I believe that law is not
a datum, but an achievement that needs ever to be renewed..." Fuller, American Legal
Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 456, 467 (1954).
41. ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, XI, ch. 13.
42. KxERKEGAARD, GESAMMELTE WERKE (Gottsched-Schrempf ed., 1910), Vol. VIII: DIE
KRANKHEIT ZUM TODE 17.
43. This is particularly true of Heidegger. On this, see my DAS SCHULDPRINZIP 105 ff.
(1961).
44. Del Vecchio, G~ttliche und menschliche Gerechtigkeit, 11 UNIVERSITAS 1054 (1956).
45. See my Gedanken zur Oberwindung des rechtsphilosophischen Relativismus, 46 ARCHIV
FUR REcHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 553 ff. (1960).
46. N. HARTMANN, DAS PROBLEM DES GEISTIGEN SEINS 464 ff. See also F. J. v. RINTELEN,
PHILOSOPHIE DEP. ENDLICHKEIT IM SPIEGEL DER GEGENWART 401 ff. (1951).
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is self-contradictory when it brings the concrete, historical situation into law
itself and consequently dispenses with any norm for a just decision. 4 7 How
could a decision on the justice of a concrete case be possible without assuming
a general norm, a measure of the right and just? If law takes its entire reality
and completion out of the concrete nature of things, its measure and founda-
tion can exist only in general norms, ideas which are absolute and above
time. At the same time general norms from which the law takes its founda-
tion and measure are not identical with law itself. This observation leads
to a distinction, a distinction between rules of law (in German: Gesetz, here
translated to include not only statutes but judge-made rules) and justice
(Recht).
That a distinction between Gesetz and Recht exists would be generally
denied by the positivists, and even most modem natural law thinkers would
recognize it only in an exceptional case. But rules of law and justice are
not the same. They are not merely occasionally distinct, but essentially So.4 8
They are related to each other as potency and act, possibility and reality.
Rules are not the full reality of justice. They are only one necessary step on
the way to justice becoming real. A rule is a general norm for a variety
of possible cases. Justice, on the other hand, decides actual situations here
and now.
4 9
The rules of law are a norm, a line, a measure for just actions. 50 In its
nature such law is general. It takes general likenesses from individual in-
stances; it schematizes; and, while it abstracts from the concrete, it achieves
general validity. Because of this abstractness it possesses permanence. It is
not touched by the mutability of the concrete; in its essence it is necessarily
unhistorical, suprahistorical. Moreover, the rules of law require an act to
be set forth. "Lex a legendo vocata est, quia scripta est," as Thomas Aquinas
has said.5 1 He speaks in this connection of the act of legislation as "'ponere."
The law has the property that it is set forth by a subject: "Illud dicitur esse
positivum quod ex voluntate . . .procedit.'" 52 Rules of law are rooted in the
47. So G. COHN, EXISTENZIALISMUS UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 155 if. (1955). To the
contrary, H. Kelsen, Existenzialismus in der Rechtswissenschaft, 43 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-
UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 161 ff. (1957). Cf. Alexander Pekelis: "Concrete cases cannot be
decided by general propositions - nor without them." LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED
ESSAYS 20 (1950).
48. Cf. my Gesetz und Recht, in EXISTENZ UND ORDNUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FiR ERIK WOLF
357 (1962).
49. A. F. UTZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM 18. BAND DER DEUTSCHEN THOMAs-AuSGABE 401 ff.
(1953), and M. E. SCHMITT, RFCHT UND VERNUNFT (1955). Cf. my Recht als Mass der
Macht, 163 STIMMEN DER ZEIT 22 ff. (1958/59).
50. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-1I, 90, 1.
51. Id. at 1-11, 90, 4.
52. Id. at I-I, 57, 2.
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authority of a lawgiver. They do not stem from being, but from the expres-
sion of a will giving a norm.
It is otherwise with justice. Justice is rooted in the natural order of
things. It does not arise from the will of some authority, but it is originally
a reflection of being.5 3 That justice is given with being is the oldest thought
of the West which we possess. This is the statement of Anaximander that all
which is is a being in order.5 4 Who thinks of being thinks also of justice.
There is an original connection between cosmos and justice. Justice is the
order of beings, in their concrete fullness, and it is, therefore, entirely con-
crete. 5 5 Justice is not a sum of norms, not an abstract scheme for legal trans-
actions. It is rather the just transaction itself, the right decision in a concrete
situation. 5 6 There is a further implication from this: Justice in the concrete,
the decision for one form of order among many in a concrete situation, par-
ticipates in the contingency and mutability of all concrete things. Justice,
then, is in its essence historical.
It is not otherwise with natural law. Justice and natural law are, indeed,
the same. Thus natural law, insofar as it is truly just, is filled with being,
is concrete, is historical. There is no absolute and unchangeable natural law.
The view of many thinkers on natural law, especially those neo-Thomists
still bogged down in idealism, regards natural law as consisting in a few
overriding, abstract, and generally valid and unchanging principles of justice
and morality. 5 7 These are not natural laws, but natural principles.58 The
expositors of natural law should finally recognize this distinction between
principles and justice. The fundamental principles of law are not themselves
53. See M. E. SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note 49, at 19 f., 33, 37; R. MARCIC, VOM GESETZES-
STAAT ZUM RIcHTERSTAAT, 123, 135, 160, 162 (1957); ERIK WOLF, DAS PROBLEM DER
NATURRECHTSLEHRE 156; cf. p. 66 (2nd ed., 1959).
54. Erik Wolf, Der Ursprung des abendlandischen Rechtsgedankens bei Anaximander und
Heraklit, in SYMPOSION, JAHRBUCH FiR PHILOSOPHIE 35 ff. (1949).
55. See Utz, op. cit. supra note 49, at 402, 433 if,; M. E. SCHMITT, Op. cit. supra note 49,
at 8, 20, 34 f., 57, 76; Maihofer, Die Natur der Sache, 44 ARcHIV FUR REcHTS- UND SOZIAL-
PHILOSOPHIE, 145 ff., 173 f. (1958); MARCIC, op. cit. supra note 53, at 125; ERIK WOLF,
op. cit. supra note 53, at 148.
56. St. Thomas suggests that originally, at least, justice stood for "the just thing itself."
SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, 57, 1.
57. On this conceptual limitation of natural law, of which the work of H. COINo, DIE
OBERSTEN GRUNDSATZE DES RECHTS (1947) and GRUNDZiUGE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE
(1950), is typical, see SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note 49, at 39 ff. Contrast Fuller, op. cit.
supra note 40, at 473: "So far as I can see it is only an ethics founded on the natural law
theory that stands to profit from advances in the scientific knowledge of human nature. It is,
furthermore, an ethics that not only permits but demands freedom in the search for a true
understanding of man. In this sense it stands at the opposite pole from any theory that at-
tempts to lay down in advance an eternal, unchanging 'code of nature.' "
58. So SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note 49, at 37, 47 ff., 52. See also my NATURRECHT UND
GESCHICHTLICHKEIT 11 If. (Diritto naturale e storicita 182 ff.); DAS SCHULDPRINZIP 113 ff.
NATURAL LAW FORUM
natural law, although they are the foundations for natural law, the founda-
tion of justice.
All justice assumes rules of law. There cannot be any legal decision
without a norm, without a measure of the just. Ontologically, justice has
primacy; logically, the rules of law are first. This does not mean that posi-
tive law is the original form of law. It means, rather, that the rules of law
of the state depend on certain fundamental decisions as to values, which the
lawgiver does not himself make, but which are given to him. It is, of course,
a problem to give a foundation for these fundamental norms or principles
of law, to determine how far and in what degree they possess absolute validity.
A certain epistemological relativity must be conceded here. But this does
not affect our problem. It is not to be denied that in each case the decisions
of the lawgiver of a state are related to determined principles of justice,
morality, and the common good, for he cannot give his commands and
prohibitions by chance. Even such an ethically colorless direction as the
command "Drive on the right" is in the last analysis based on the fifth com-
mandment of the Decalogue.
The state's positive law is already a gradual actualization and concret-
izing of the fundamental principles, already a step on the way to concrete
justice. To give law positive form is not simply an act of deduction. Rather
it may be done only by a confrontation, achieved in the thought of the law-
giver, with possible concrete situations in which the law will be valid. The
way of producing positive law is thus deductive and inductive at the same
time. It is an association of abstract fundamental norms with the concrete
nature of things. This concretizing and differentiation can go very far at
times, but never further than the commandment to treat equal cases equally.
The law must always be considered as governing a number of cases; it always
possesses a certain degree of generality. It is not valid to push the differentia-
tion in an endless casuistry until individual cases are considered purely as
individual cases, because then the normative nature of law, its function as
measure and rule of just behavior, is destroyed. 59 Positive law is neither
purely abstract nor purely concrete. It is neither entirely suprahistorical nor
entirely historical, but it is valid for a more or less longer period of time, for
a legal period. Law is the hardened shape of justice, justice in a frozen form,
justice in a certain state of becoming.
59. Cf. H. HENKEL, RECHT UND INDIVIDUALITAT 18 (1958). A fundamental book on this
problem is K. ENGISCH, DIE IDEE DER KONKRETISIERUNO IN RECHT UND RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT UNSERER ZEIT (1953).
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The development of justice is completed in three stages. The first is the
fundamental norm or natural principles. The second is the positive law. The
third is the decision in a concrete situation.6 0 It is in the concrete decision
that law finally attains its complete being, that it comes to be entirely real.
Each decision of law is, then, "a piece in the actual building of the law," a
piece of reality. 6 1
Justice is not contained in a complete form in any particular act of rule
making, so that it may be simply read off from the rule. Yet this fact must
not mean that a rule of law is but a recommendation to the judge who could
push a statute aside according to his own will. There can be no thought of
this. The judge is under all circumstances tied to law. But the law is in no
case the only source for concrete judicial decisions. These are always and
essentially derived from the nature of things. As Marcic has put it in an
Aristotelian way, they are derived from the "middle of the concrete situa-
tion." 62 The method of concrete legal decisions is like that of positive legisla-
tion: it is deductive and inductive at the same time. A legal decision is not
exceptionally, but generally, a creative task, and never a pure application
of law in the sense of a subsumption of facts under a logical syllogism. To
determine the law is not simply to bring an abstract order of law into existence.
It is rather to find the just order in each and every historical situation. 63 It
60. Proceeding from different assumptions, Kelsen also works out a similar process of devel-
oping the legal order from fundamental norms down to the concrete decision. See KELSEN,
REINE RECHTSLEHRE 228 ff., esp. 242 ff., 255 ff. (2nd ed., 1960). Similarly Thomas
Aquinas held that the doing of justice was completed only with the judgment of the judge.
Cf. SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-H, 60, 1. On this see UTz, op. cit. supra note 49, at 465 ff.
61. F. WIEACKER, GESETZ UND RICHTERKUNST 7 (1958).
62. MARCIC, op. cit. supra note 53, at 312.
63. Cf. G. STRATENWERTH, VERANTWORTUNG UND GEIIORSAM. ZUR STRAFRECHTLICHEN
WERTUNO HOHEITLICH GEBOTENEN VERHALTENS 104 (1958). A quite similar out-
look seems to characterize the dominant views in the American law schools as indicated
in the recent remarks of Dean Eugene V. Rostow of the Yale Law School, American Legal
Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 Rocxy MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW 123, 134
(1962):
During the past twenty years or so, the stress in the American literature about law
has been on this part of the equation - the quest for standards and values in the process
of guiding the evolution of "the law that is" into the law we think it ought to become.
The formulation and acceptance of ends, these writers know, helps to fix the line of
growth of the law. Of those who have contributed this panel to the body of our thought
about law, I might mention particularly Felix Cohen, F. S. C. Northrop, Messrs. Laswell
and McDougal, Henry Hart, Friedrich Kessler, Jerome Hall, Lon Fuller and Edmond
Cahn. Their work has helped to correct and offset the relative neglect of the problem
of values which characterized the more positivistic outlook of the earlier legal realists.
[ . Tihe lawyer, judge, legislator or law teacher . .. sees every social conflict,
every case, no matter how small, as an inseparable part of a larger whole. For him, each
settlement, each decision, each opinion derives its validity and its legitimacy from his
conscientious effort to make certain that it represents not only law, but good law. The
lawyer, the legislator, the judge and the law professor have different functions, different
degrees of discretion, different zones of choice. But they confront the same standard of
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is first in the legal decision that law becomes justice. The:court is the place
where law is realized in its fullness. But the court is not the only place Where
what is just is to be determined. What is said of the just in court is analogously
valid for all instances where concrete legal decisions are involved, in the
functions, for example of the administration of a. state or in the functions
of lawyers. All these actions together work for the building' of the law and
its development. They are participants in the task of making the law just.
duty and responsibility. The modern lawyer can find no workable boundary between
law and policy, for he acknowledges law to be policy expressed in certain forms. His
:motto is Brandeis' remark, "No question is ever settled until it is settled right." For
him the sense of the profession, the sense which justifies it, and makes it worthy of his
dreams, is precisely that it is and must be the appointed agency of our society's sense
of justice. :
